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PEISER

A. No. 24894.

v.

METTLER

In Bank.

[50 C.2d

July 11, 1958.]

HENRIETTA M. PEISER et al., Appellants, v. WILLIE H.
METTLER et al., Respondents.
[1] Venue-Determination of Character of Action.-The nature of
a cause of action so far as it affects or determines the place of
trial will be ascertained from the complaint alone.
[2] !d.-Actions Ex Contractu.-A cause of action for damages for
breach of contract is transitory in character.
[3] Landlord and Tenant--Assignment--Rights and Liabilities of
Assignor.-Ordinarily, an assignment of a lease does not release the lessee from his obligation though the lessor consents
to the assignment or the assignee expressly assumes obligations
under the lease.
[4] !d.-Assignment--Operation and Effect.-In a limited sense, an
assignment of a lease makes the lessee a surety for the assignee
as between the assignee and the lessee, but as between lessor
and lessee the lessee remains a primary obligor under his express contract to pay rent.
[5] !d.-Remedies of Landlord-Pleading-Parties.-Where an
original lessee remains liable under the lease notwithstanding
its assignment to others, he is a proper and necessary party to
an action for damages for breach of the lease.
[6] Venue-Change of Venue-Hearing.-On the hearing of a
motion for change of venue by defendants residing outside
the county in which the action is pending, the court should not
try, on conflicting affidavits, the issues of fact going to the
merits of the cause of action stated against a resident defendant.
[7] !d.-Change of Venue-Hearing.-On the hearing of a motion
by defendants residing outside the county in which the action
is pending for change of venue on the ground of improper
[1] See Cal.Jur., Venue, §§ 5, 41; Am.Jur., Venue, § 8.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 222.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Venue, § 6; [2] Venue, § 26; [3]
Landlord and Tenant,§ 189; [4] Landlord and Tenant,§ 183; [5]
Landlord nnd Tenant, § 269; [6-8, 32] Venue, § 73; [9] Venue, ~ 8;
[10, 11] Venue, ~ 7; [12] Actions, § 43; [13] Actions, § 2; [14]
Landlord and Tenant, § 263; [15] Fixtures, § 11; [161 Fixtures,
§ 18; [17] Venue, § 41; [18] Venut>, § 42; [19, 30, 31] Venue,
§ 39(4); [20] Venue, § 64; [21] Venue, § 68; [22] Usages and
Customs, § 15; [23, 241 Usages and Customs, § 2; [2'1-271 Lanrllord
and Tenant, § 130; [28] Usages and Customs. ~ 9: [291 Words and
Phrases; [33] Venue, § 68; [34] Venue, §§ 39(1), 39(4); [35]
Venue, 39(1).
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joinder of a defendant residing in the county, the real issue is
whether plaintiff, in joining the resident defendant as a party,
had reasonable ground for the belief in good faith that plaintiff had a cause of action against the resident defendant;
if he did, it may not be said that the resident defendant was
improperly joined as a defendant or was made a defendant
solely for the purpose of having the action tried in the county
of the resident defendant within the meaning of Code Civ.
Proc., § 395.
[8] !d.-Change of Venue-Hearing.-On the hearing of a motion
for change of venue, the question of the transitory or local
character of the causes of action must be determined from
the allegations of the complaint on file at the time the motion
was made and from the nature of the judgment which might
be rendered thereon, assuming the truth of the allegations.
[9a, 9b] Id.-Where Causes of Action Are Joined.-Where it appears, from a complaint joining causes of action for breach of
contract (lease), conversion of eertain structures and improvements, restoration and reinstallment of the same structures
and improvements, and waste "if such property cannot be restored," that the main relief sought in all causes of action is
personal and that title to, or possession of, real property is
only incidentally involved, it is error to grant defendants' motions for change of venue on the ground that the action is local
and must be tried at the situs of the real property pursuant to
Code Civ. Proc., § 392.
[10] Id.-Where Causes of Action Are Joined.-When an action
partly local and partly transitory is stated in separate causes
of action, it is regarded as transitory in determining the place
of trial.
[11] Id.-Where Causes of Action Are Joined.-If there is a personal or in personam cause of action joined with one that is
local in nature, defendant is entitled to have the proceeding
transferred to the county of his residence; the action must
be wholly local in nature to require it to be brought in the
county of situs as designated in Code Civ. Proc., § 392,
subd. (a).
[12] Actions-Joinder of Causes of Action.-The seeking of different kinds of relief does not establish different causes of
action.
[13] !d.-Cause of Action.-A cause of action is based on the injury to plaintiff, not the particular legal theory of defendant's
wrongful act.
[14] Landlord and Tenant-Remedies of Landlord.-Where plaintiffs set forth four causes of action but actually allege only one
[9] See Cal.Jur., Venue, § 7.
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namely, the removal of improvements from leased
in violation of the terms of the lease, the different
counts should not be considered as different causes of action
but as alternative methods of pleading plaintiff's right of
redress of the same wrong.
[15] Fixtures-Effect of Severance.-The severance of fixtures and
improvements from land changes the character of the property
from real to personal, irrespective of the means by which it is
accomplished.
[16] !d.-Remedies.-Where a fixture annexed to a freehold is
tortiously severed, the owner of the realty, at his option, may
treat the fixture as personalty and recover it by an action of
replevin.
[17] Venue-Change of Venue-Several Defendants.-Even when
all defendants join in a demand for or consent to a change of
venue, the cause will be retained if the complaint attempts in
t;pparent good faith to state a transitory cause of action
against a defendant who resides in the county where the
action is commenced.
[18] !d.-Change of Venue-Several Defendants.-A plaintiff who
has brought his action in the proper county will not be compelled to go elsewhere merely because all defendants prefer

it.
[19] !d.-Change of Venue-Convenience of Witnesses.-Before
the convenience of witnesses may be considered as a ground
for an order granting a chang·e of venue it must be shown that
their proposed testimony is admissible, relevant and material
to some issue in the case as shown by the record before the
court.
[20] !d.-Change of Venue-Burden of Proof.-A party moving
for change of venue for convenience of witnesses has the burden of proving that both such convenience and the ends of
justice will be promoted by the change. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 397, subd. 3.)
[21] !d.-Change of Venue-Affidavits.-Affidavits in support of a
motion for change of venue for convenience of witnesses must
set forth the names of the witnesses, the nature of the testimony expected from each, and the reasons why the attendance
of each would be inconvenient.
[22] Usages and Customs-Pleading.-Existence of a custom which
is not so general that it will be presumed to have been known
to the parties or of which a court will take judicial knowledge
must be pleaded to warrant acceptance of evidence thereof.
[23] !d.-Knowledge.-A person is not bound by a custom or usage
unless he had actual knowledge thereof, or it is so general or
well known in the community as to give rise to the presumption
of knowledge.
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[24] Id.-Knowledge.-Customs of special trades and local usages
which are limited to certain communities are not presumed to
be known to all persons; to bind one who is not engaged in the
trade or occupation which employs the usage relied on, proof
of his actual knowledge of the usage is necessary unless it is
so commonly accepted that the public is presumed to recognize
its existence.
[25] Landlord and Tenant - Improvements - Disposition of Improvements at End of Term.-Under a lease providing that "all
. . . improvements of a substantial or permanent character or
that may be attached to the land, shall revert to and become
the absolute property of Lessor," the term "improvement" is
comprehensive enough to embrace all additions or alterations
which may be made by a tenant for the convenience of his business on the premises; it is more comprehensive than the word
"fixtures," and while including these, includes also many
things that may not be classed as fixtures.
[26] !d.-Improvements-Disposition of Improvements at End of
Term.-Where a lease provides that improvements made on the
premises during the term of the lease shall inure to the lessor
at the expiration of the term, the parties' intention, as expressed by their written agreement, rather than a custom in
the county that the tenant could remove improvements plaeed
on the land, is controlling.
[27] !d.-Improvements-Disposition of Improvements at End of
Term.-\Vhere a lease providing that improvements made on
the premises shall inure to the lessor on termination of the
lease specifically separates substantial or permanent improvements from those that might be attached to the land, the
movable character of any of the improvements is not a matter
of controlling importance.
[28] Usages and Customs-Contradicting Terms of Instrument.Where a lease specifically provides that improvements made
on the premises shall inure to the lessor on termination of the
lease, evidence of a custom in the county that the tenant could
remove improvements placed on the land is inadmissible as
tending to vary or contradict the terms of the lease agreement,
and testimony concerning such custom is not material.
[29] Words and Phrases-"Substantial."-The term "substantial"
as it relates to the word "amount" imports a considerable
amount of value in opposition to that which is inconsequential
or small.
[30a, 30b] Venue-Change of Venue-Convenience of Witnesses.
-Where the pleadings alleged the value of improvements on
leased premises to be substantial within the meaning of the
lease agreement, but there was nothing in the record indicating
that the witnesses to be produced were the only witnesses
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who could testify to the value of the improvements because of
their personal knowledge of the facts, the convenience of those
witnesses should not be considered on a motion for change of
venue.
[31] Id.- Change of Venue- Convenience of Witnesses.-Generally, the convenience of experts should not be considered in
determining the question of convenience of witnesses on application for change of venue except where the experts have a
personal knowledge of the facts on which their testimony is
to be based.
[32] !d.-Change of Venue-Hearing.-The value of improvements
on leased premises is a question for the trier of fact on a trial
of the case after hearing expert testimony or receiving stipulation of the parties, and should not be considered on a motion
for change of venue.
[33] !d.-Change of Venue-Affidavits.-In an action against a
lessee and assignees for breach of lease, conversion and waste
arising from removal of "substantial" improvements from
the leased premises, where witnesses' affidavits in support of
a motion for change of venue on the ground of convenience
of witnesses, did not state that their testimony would be that
the improvements were not substantial within the meaning of
the lease agreement, their testimony would not be material to
the issues of the case as presented by the motion, and the affidavits were therefore improperly considered by the trial court.
[34] !d.-Change of Venue-Convenience of Parties.-Convenience
of the parties is not considered on a motion for change of
venue, at least where an affidavit concerning the physical disability of one defendant does not aver that he would be called
as a witness to give material evidence or state what his
evidence would be.
[35] !d.-Change of Venue-Convenience of Witnesses.-The fact
that one defendant's books and records are located in a county
other than the one in which the action is pending, or that the
court calendar in the county first mentioned is less congested
than that in the other, does not warrant a change of venue for
convenience of witnesses.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County granting change of venue. Aubrey N. Irwin,
Judge. Reversed.
J_,ivingston & Borregard, Lawrence Livingston, Leo E.
Borregard and Isabella H. Grant for Appellants.
Vizzard, Baker & Sullivan, J\'Iaas & Nairn and Donahue &
Goldberg for Respondents.
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CARTER, J.-Plaintiffs appeal from an order granting defendants' motions for a change of venue from J_,os Angeles
County to Kern County. TlHe motious were made and granted
on the grounds of (1) residence of defendants; (2) that the
action involved damage or injury to real property situated in
Kern County; and
because of eonvenience of witne<;ses.
'l'he eomplaint alleges that the controversy here involved
grew out of a written lease agreement involving land situated
in Kern County. Plaintiffs are the original lessors, or their
successors; defendant Mettler was the original lessee. Defendant Mettler assigned the lease to defendants Fry who
sublet the easterly one-half of the premises to defendant
Garner who subsequently sublet part of his interest to defendant Moore. 'l'he lease was executed and recorded in 1945.
Under the terms of the lease the lessee was given the option
to extend the term thereof for a five-year period. The option
was exercised by defendants Fry as ·will hereinafter appear.
The lease which is made part of the complaint provides:
"4. That Lessee shall drill and complete two (2) wells to
irrigate said land in the proper cultivation and farming thereof; that Lessee shall construct and lay at least two (2) milt>s
of fourteen (14) inch concrete irrigation pipeline and install
pumps for such irrigation purposes; that the aforesaid construction and installation of pumps, pipeline and any and all
other improvements that may be made by Lessee shall be at
the sole cost and expense of Lessee.
"5. That upon the t>xpiration or soo1wr or other termination of this lease all of said pipt>line and pumps so built and
installed as aforesaid, and all otlwr improvements of a substantial or permanent character, or that ma:v be attached to
the land, shall revert to and become the absolute property of
Lessor, free and clear of an:v and all claims against the same."
The lease then continued as follows:
"11. That in the event Lessee desires to extend the term
of this lease for an additional :five ( 5) years from date of expiration hereof the option herein granted for such extension
must be exercised by said Lessee by written notice to r~essor of
Lessee's intention so to do not less than three ( 3) months
before the date of expiration."
"13. In thr event Lessee assigns or subleases an:v of the
leased land in whole or in part, r~essee Rhall rrmain responsible
and liable for the performance of all obligations herein contained, unless consent of Lessor is obtained in writing, to
assign or sublease."
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"17. That this lease and all the terms, covenants and conditions herein contained, subject to the provisions as to assignments, shall apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators and assigns of the parties hereto."
In 1947, 1\Iettler, the original lessee, assigned the lease to
defendants
who agreed that they would "well and truly
keep and perform each and every covenant and condition in
said lease
original lease agre0ment] provided to be perfornwd by the lessee and will hold the assignor he1·ein free
and blamE'less from payment of said rentals and performance
of sairl covenants and conditions."
In 1949. defendants Fry sublet, subject to the" Assignment
of r~ease," to defendant Garner the easterly one-half of the
property. In l 950, defendants Fry gave written notice to
plaintiffs that they intended to exercise the option to extend
the lease for a five-year period. Drfendant Mettler did not
obtain written consent from the original lessors for the assignment to d0fendants Fry.
At various times subsequent to the execution of the original
lease defendants installed in or built upon the leased premises:
"1. A pipe line more than two (2) miles in length and approximately 14" in diameter was built and installed in the
land. 2. Three (3) deep wells were drilled and constructed
to connect with said pipe line as integral part of the irrigation
system of said property. 3. As appurtenances to said wells
there were attachf'd thereto shafts, boles, pumps, motors and
pipelines, all of which were integral parts of the irrigation
system of said property. 4. There were also installed and
attached to pipelines three (3) sumps, together with thf'ir
appurtenances, including three (3) tail-water pumps, motors
and pipe lines, all of which were also integral parts of said
irrigation system. 5. There were built upon said property
two (2) oue-story dwelling houses, one (1) duplex dwelling
house, one (1) general utility building, one (1) two-car
garage, one (1) shed and additional structures, the exact
nature and character of which are unknown to plaintiffs
and are well known to defendants."
Plaintiffs allege that defendants, or some of them. brearhed
tl1e terms of the le11se by removing from the premises one
deep well shaft, bole, pipeline, motor and pump; two tailwater pumps and motors and pipelines attached; two dwelling
houses; one duplex dwelling; one general utility building;
one shed; and the other buildings heretofore described to
their damage in the sum of $31,275.20. The complaint sets
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forth four "causes of action": (1) breach of contract; (2)
damages for conversion of the structures and improvements;
(3) restoration and redelivery of the removed property together with damages resulting from the cost of reinstallation
and for loss of use; and
one for waste to the real property
arising from the removal of the heretofore described property.
Defendant Mettler, defendants Fry and defendants Garner
and Moore filed three separate answers. At the same time
all defendants filed separate motions for change of venue (the
grounds of which have been heretofore set forth) from Los
Angeles to Kern County. The affidavits in support thereof,
which plaintiffs unsuccessfully moved to strike, will be considered subsequently.
Plaintiffs concede that if any of the three grounds upon
which the trial court granted defendants' motions for change
of venue can be supported the order should be affirmed.
RESIDENCE OF DEFENDANTS

Defendant Mettler by affidavit admits that he is a resident
of Los Angeles County. The other defendants are residents
of Kern County. It is defendants' argument that defendant
Mettler was joined only for the purpose of securing venue in
Los Angeles County. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, maintain
that Mettler is a proper and necessary party. Therefore,
the first question that presents itself is whether the complaint
states a cause of action against defendant Mettler. [1] "The
nature of the cause of action so far as it affects or determines
the place of trial will be ascertained from the complaint alone,
and the court will inspect the complaint for the purpose of
determining the character of the action and the judg-ment
which may be rendered." (Sam Fin man, Inc. v. Rokuz li olding Corp., 130 Cal.App.2d 758, 759-760 [27!) P.2d 982].) We
held in Kaluzok v. Brisson, 27 Cal.2d 760, 762 [167 P.2d 481,
163 A.L.R. 1308], that "To decide the question [as to whether
a defendant was entitled to a change of venue] it is necessary
to determine the nature of the action as disclosed by the
complaint, and the scope of the judgment which mig-ht be
Pntered on default ( N ect v. JI olmcs, 19 Cal.2d 605
22 p .2d
557] ; EcksfTancl v. Wnslwsen, 217 CaL 380 [18 P.2d 931];
GTorcrs' Fruit Growing Union v. Kern County Lwncl Co.,
150 Cal. 466 f89 P. 1201; McFarland v. Mart?:n, 144 Cal. 771
[78 P. 239])." [2] Plaintiffs' fin:t cause of action is for
damages for breach of contract which is clearly a transitory
cause of action. In the Kaluzok case, S1lpra, the action was one
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for damages for fraudulent representations made by the
sellers of real property in order to induce the plaintiffs to buy
land. In holding that the action was a transitory one, we
said that the ''gravamen of the present action is damages for
deceit" and that the "title to the real property would not be
affected. 'l'hat title remains in the plaintiffs as before, encumbered by the same deed of trust given to seeure whatever
sum the plaintiffs arc in law obligated to pay the defendants.
No interest in the real property is determined or affected."
(Kaluzok v. Brisson, 27 Cal.2(1 760, 763, 764 [167 P.2d 481,
163 A.L.R. 1308}.)
It will be recalled that under the terms of the lease agreement defendant Mettler remained liable to the lessors on the
lease even though he assignetl it unless he obtained the written
consent of the lessors. No such written consent was obtained.
Mettler's assignees took with notice of the terms and provisions of the lease and subject thereto. The complaint alleged
a breach of the terms of the lease by defendant Mettler and/or
the defendant assignees. [3] However, as we held in DeHart v. Allen, 26 Cal.2d 829, 832 [161 P.2d 453], "Ordinarily
an assignment of a lease does not release the lessee from his
obligations even though the lessor consents to the assignment.
(Samuels v. Ottinger, 169 Cal. 209, 212 [146 P. 638, Ann.Cas.
1916E 830].)
Nor does the express assumption by the
assignee of obligations under the lease affect the liability of
the lessee to the lessor. (Lopizich v. Salter, 45 Cal.App. 446,
449 [187 P. 1075]; 32 Am .•Jur. 315.) [4] It has sometimes
been said that the effect of an assignment i8 to make the lessee
a surety for the assignee. (Sarnu.els v. Ottinger, 169 Cal. 209,
212 [146 P. 638, Ann.Cas. 1916E 830] ; Brosnan v. Kramer,
135 Cal. 36, 39 [66 P. 979] ; Schehr v. Berkey, 166 Cal. 157,
160 [135 P. 41].) This may be true in a limited sense as
between the assignee and his assignor, the lessee, but as between the lessor and the lessee the latter remains a primary
obligor under his expre:ss contract to pay rent. (T.A.D. Jones
Co. v. Winchestet· Repeating Arms Co., 55 F.2d 944, 61 F.2d
774, cert. denied, 288 U.S. 609 [53 S.Ct. 401, 77 L.Ed. 983] ;
Tiffany on Landlord and 'I'enant, vol. 1, p. 994; 32 Am.Jur.
310-311, 321.)" [5] It is obvious from the above cited rule
that defendant Mettler remained liable under the lease and
was, therefore, a proper and necessary party to the action
and that the complaint states a cause of action as to him.
(Russello v. Mori, 153 Cal.App.2d 828 [315 P.2d 343]; Taff v.
Goodman, 41 Cal.App.2d 771, 776 [107 P.2d 431] .) In Cali-
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fornia Collection Agency v. Fontana, 61 Cal.App.2d 648, 653
[143 P.2d 507], an order granting a motion for a change of
venue was reversed. [6] The court there said : "It also
appears clear from the language of the decisions that upon
the hearing of such motion, the court should not try, upon
conflicting affidavits, the issues of fact going to the merits
of the cause of action stated against the resident defendant.
(Pacific Coast Auto. Assn. v. Ahlf., 115 Cal.App. 21, 24 [300
P. 841]; Sourbis v. Rhoads, 50 Cal.App. 98, 101 [194 P. 521);
~Mitchell v. Kim, 42 Cal.App. 111, 114 [183 P. 368]; Lakeshore C. Co. v. Modoc L. & L. Co., 108 Cal. 261, 262 f41 P.
472]; McKenzie v. Barling, 101 Cal. 459, 462 [36 P. 8].)
[7] In our opinion the rule, supported by reason and by
authority, is that upon the hearing of the motion for change
of venue under the circumstancrs presented herr, the rral
issue for determination by the trial court was whether plaintiff, in joining the resident defendant as a party, had rrasonable grounds for the belief in good faith that plaintiff had a
cause of action against the resident defendant. If he did, then
we do not believe that it may be said that the resident defendant was improperly joined as a defendant or was made a
defendant solely for the purpose of having the action tried
in the county of the residence of the reBident defendant within
the meaning of section 395 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
(McClung v. Watt, 190 Cal. 155 r21l P. 17]; Freeman V.
Dowl,ing, 219 Cal. 213 [25 P.2d 980] ; Gntfesfcld v. Richma£d
Ice Cream Co., 115 Cal.App.2d 854 [252 P.2d 973].) It
follows, from the foregoing, that the trial court erred in
granting defrndants' motion for a change of venue on the
ground of defendants' residence.
LOCAL OR TRANSITORY NATURE OF THE CASE

[8]

The question of the transitory or local character of
the causes of action must be determined from the allegations
of the complaint on file at the time the motion waB madt> and
from the nature of the judgment which might be rendered
thereon, assuming the truth of the allegations. (N eet Y.
Holmes, 19 CaL2d 605, 607 [122 P.2d 557]; Sheeley v. Jones,
192 Cal. 256 [219 P. 744]; Eckstmnd v. Wilslmscn, 217 Cal.
380 [18 P.2d 931]; Sausen v. Anderton, 129 Cal.App.2d 324
[276 P.2d 814]; Bybee v. Fairch£ld, 75 Cal.App.2d 35 [170
P.2d 54].)
In the case under consideration, plaintiffs' complaint contained four so-called causes of action: breach of contract;
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conversion of certain sirnci nn•s and improvenwnts; n•"toration and reinRtallmcnt of the same structures mH1 improvements; and a cause of action for waste ''if such propr,rt:v
eannot be restored.'' Plaintiffs prayed for damages for breach
of contrad, together with attorneys'
for the first two
causes of ar:tion for the retnrn of ilw clcscribe<1 improvements
together vvith damages for reinstallation and los~ of nse on the
third eause of aetion; or. in the
for
loss of use and the value of the improvemrnts in the eve11t the
improvements eonld not be restored; for damag,•s in the
amount of the value of the improvr'ments and for trebled
damages in the cause of action for waste.
[9a] It would appear from the allegations and prayer of
the eomplaint that the main relief songht in all four causes
of aetion was personal and that title to, or possession of, real
property was only ineillentalJy involved. As we held in N eet
v. Holmes, E) Cal.2d 606, 611-612 [122 P.2d 357], "'fhe nature
of the action here is Cflflentially transitory, that is, the defendants would be entitled to have it tried in the eounty of: their
resid('nce, if the determination of an estate or iutcrrst in land
is merely ineidental to the determination of a cause for equitable relief in trust, frand, or contraet. 'l'hc nahu·e of the action
is local, and must be tried in the county >\'here the land is
situated, where it turns on the title to property as distinct
from the pprsonal obligation, and the decree operates ex
propTio vigore 011 the title. (Stair v. RolfCtl Consolidated
Mining Co., 187 Cal. 34:3, 851 [202 P. 18:3].) In Booker v.
Aitken, 140 Cal. 471 [74 P. 11], an aetion to recover real
property on the ground that a deed of said prorwrty was
invalid for fraud, was deemed to be local and an order denying a motion for a change of venue to the county of the
defendant's resicleHcn was aftlrmed. The prineiples hereinabove stated were reeognLoed and it was expressly pointed out
that in that case neitlwr a personal aceouuting nor a money
judgment was sought, and that the substantial and only specific appropriate n•lief rela1ed to the title of the land drcued
to the defendant. Similar cases are Eckstrand v. VVilslmscn,
217 Cal. 380 [18 P.2(1 931] and State v. Royal Consol1:datcd
Mining Co., supra.
"In the present case it is obvious that the action turns
principally on the personal obligation, as distinet from the
title, and that judgment for any mining propertiPs not now
owned by the plaintiffs would follow if at all, nwrely as an
incident of the judgment establishing the personal obligation."
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[10] In Rosen v. Kessler, 145 Cal.App.2d 676, 683 [303
P.2d 110], the court held: "Under the general rule, when
an action is partly local and partly transitory and stated in
separate causes of action, it is to be regarded as transitory in
determining the place of trial.'' (See also II enderson v.
Henderson, 85 Cal.App.2d 476 [193 P.2d 135].)
[11] In Hardy v. White, 130 Cal.App.2d 550, 552 [279
P.2d 126], the court said: The well settled rule is that if
there is a personal, or ·in personam, cause of action joined with
one that is local in nature, the defendant is entitled to have
the proceeding transferred to the county of his residence.
The action must be wholly local in nature to require ·it to be
brought in the county of the situs as designated in section
392, subdivision (a), Code of Civil Procedure. (Turlock
Theatre Co. v. Laws, 12 Cal.2d 573, 576 [86 P.2d 345, 120
A.L.R. 786] ; see California cases collected in 120 A.L.R. 791792.) '' (Emphasis added.)
\Vhile the case at bar could be considered to come within
the rules just set forth, it appears to us that the complaint
sets forth only one cause of action stated on four different
legal theories even though the theories are called separate
''causes of action.'' The entire transaction arose out of the
alleged breach of the lease agreement by defendant Mettler,
the original lessee, and his assignees and the sublessees. The
so-called fourth cause of action for waste is also predicated
on the lease agreement in that the lease provides, and plaintiffs
so allege, that "lessee shall not commit any waste or damage, or
suffer any to be done .... " [12] It was held in California
Trust Co. v. Cohn, 214 Cal. 619, 629 [7 P.2d 297], that "The
seeking of different kinds of relief does not establish different
causes of action." (Security Loan etc. Co. v. Mattern, 131
Cal. 326 [63 P. 482] .) [13] 'l'he cause of action is based
upon the injury to the plaintiff and not the particular legal
theory of the defendant's wrongful act (Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., 21 Cal.2d 636 (134 P.2d 242] ; Steiner v.
'Thomas, 94 Cal.App.2d 655 [211 P.2d 321]). [14] In the
ease under consideration, plaintiffs have alleged but one wrong
-the removal of the improvements heretofore described in
violation of the terms of the lease. In an analogous situation
in a change of venue case the court, in Maselli v. E. H. Appleby
& Co., Inc., 117 Cal.App.2d 634, 636, 637 [256 P.2d 618],
said : "It is obvious from the allegations of all three counts
contained in the complaint that the common counts are not
based on separate contracts and that there was in fact only

606

PEISER V. METTLER

[50 C.2d

one transaction out of which this suit arose. Although our
case law permits the use of common counts, nevertheless the
courts recognize that where the common counts follow a count
wherein all of the facts on which plaintiff's demand is based
are specifically pleaded and the common counts upon their face
make it clear that they are based upon the same set of facts,
the common counts are to be considered not as different causes
of action, but as alternative methods of pleading the plaintiff's
right to recover the money judgnient he seeks."
[15] There is no merit to defendants' argument that the
''causes of action'' for conversion and replevin involve ''real
property." The severance of the fixtures and improvements
from the land ''changed the character of the property from
real to personal, irrespective of the means by which it was
accomplished." (Buckmd v. Swift, 27 Cal. 433, 436 [87 Am.
Dec. 90] .) [16] In Teater v. Good Hope Dev. Corp., 14
Cal. 2d 196, 208 [93 P.2d 112], we held that " . . . Where a
fixture annexed to a freehold is tortiously severed, the owner
of the realty, at his option, may treat the fixture as personalty
and recover the same by the action of replevin. . . . '' (22
Cal.Jur.2d, § 38, pp. 324, 325.)
[9b] Whether we consider that there has been a joinder
of transitory causes of action with a local action and that
the transitory actions control so far as venue is concerned,
or whether we consider that plaintiffs have stated only one
transitory cause of action, the result is the same under the
rules and authorities heretofore set forth and the trial court
was in error in granting the defendants' motions for change
of venue on the ground that the action was a local one which
must be tried at the situs of the real property pursuant to
the provisions of section 392 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The fact that defendant Mettler joined with the other defendants in moving for a change of venue is immaterial.
[17] As we said in Monogram Co. v. Kingsley, 38 Cal.2d
28, 30 [237 P.2d 265], "Even when all of the defendants join
in a demand for or consent to a change of venue the cause
will be retained if the complaint attempts in apparent good
faith to state a cause of action against a defendant who resides
in the county where the action was commenced. . . . [18] [A l
plaintiff who has brought this action in the proper county will
not be compelled to go elsewhere merely because all of the
defendants prefer it." (Independent Iron Works v. American
Pres. Lines, Ltd., 35 Cal.2d 858 [221 P.2d 939] .)
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CoNVENIENCE OF WITNESsEs

[19]

Before the convenience of witnesses may be considered as a ground for an order granting a elJange of venue
it mnst be shown that their proposed testimony is admissible,
relevant and material to some issue in the case as shown by
the record before the court (JJ1iller & Lux v. Kern County
Land Co., 140 Cal. 132, 138 [73 P. 836]; Wong F'ung Hing
v. San Francisco etc. Funds, 15 CaLApp. 537 [115 P. 331] ;
Mize v. Old Taylor Fruit Co., 114 Cal.App. 588 [300 P. 128] ;
Ifarden v. Skinnet· & Hammond, 130 Cal.App.2d 750 [279 P.2d
978]).
Plaintiffs concede that the witnesses whose convenience is
to be considered are residents of Kern County.
[20] Section 397, subdivision 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the court may, on motion change the
place of trial "'\Vhen the convenience of witnesses and the
ends of justice would be promoted by the change." In
Willingham v. Pecora, 44 Cal.App.2d 289, 295 [112 P.2d 328],
it was held that both of the eonditions--convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice-must occur and that the moving
party has the burden of proving that both conditions will be
met.
[21] The affidavits in support of the motion for change
of venue on this ground must set forth the names of the
witnesses, the nature of the testimony expectrd from each,
and the reasons why the attendancr of each would be inconvrnient. (Juneatl v. J1cnea11, 45 Cal.App.2d 14 [113 P.2d
463] ; San Jose 11 ospital v. Etherton, 84 Cal.App. 516 r258
P. 611]; Harden v. Skinner & Hammond, 130 Ca1.App.2d 750,
755 [279 P.2d 978] .)
Some 20 affidavits were filed in support of the motions
for change of venue. The witnesses' (as distinguished from
the parties' and attornrys') affidavits were devoted, primarily, to averments that there was a custom and usage in
Kern County that buildings such as those hrre involved,
pumps, motors, tail water pumps, etc., were considrred personalty which were removable by the lessee dnring, or at the
end of the term. Othrr afiidavits were concrnwd with the value
of the improvements and the mannrr of thrir attachnwnt to
the real property.
Plaintiffs contend that their motion to strike thr affidavits
should have been grantrd; that the evidence as to custom and
usage was inadmissible, immaterial and irrelevant because
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( 1) it was not pleaded by the defendants;
it was not
shown that plaintiffs knew or should have known of the purported custom and usage ; ( 3) that the purported custom and
usage would vary and contradict the terms of the lease-not
interpret it; and ( 4) that the testimony relating to the purported custom and usage was to be given by expert witnesses
whose convenience is not to be considered.
Defendants concede that custom and usage was not pleaded
by them. [22] In Tharp v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., 27
Cal.App.2d 554, 561 [81 P.2d 443, 82 P.2d 21], it was held
that ''it is the invariable rule that evidence of a custom which
is not so general in its character that it will be presumed to
have been known to the parties or of which a court will take
judicial knowledge must be pleaded to warrant the acceptance of evidence of such custom . . . . The appellant failed to
plead the custom, the proof of which he sought to introduce."
(Pray v. Trower Lumber Co., 101 Cal.App. 482 [281 P.
1036].) There is nothing in the record to show that plaintiffs
knew, or should have known, of the purported custom and
usage and defendants' only argument on this point is that
plaintiffs were lessors of farm land located in Kern County.
As the court said in Mize v. Old Taylor Fruit Co., 114 Cal.
App. 588, 590 [300 P. 128], "the affidavit in support of the
motion fails to supply this necessary link connecting the testimony of the inconvenienced witnesses with the issues in the
case." [23] And, as was held, in Roberts Distrib. Co. v.
Kaye-Halbert Corp., 126 Cal.App.2d 664, 676 [272 P.2d 886],
''A person is not bound by a custom or usage unless he had
actual knowledge thereof, or it is so general or well-known in
the community as to give rise to the presumption of such
knowledge." [24] In Miller v. Stults, 143 Ca1.App.2d 592,
602 [300 P.2d 312], it was said: " ' . . . Customs of special
trades and local usages which are limited to certain communities are not presumed to be known to all persons. (Jones
on Evidence, 3d ed., p. 714, § 464.) To bind one who is not
engaged in the trade or occupation which employs the usage
relied upon, proof of his actual knowledge of the usage is
necessary, unless it is so commonly accepted that the public is
presumed to recognize its existence. . . . '
'' . . . So in the case at bar it does not appear that either
party manifested an intention to be governed by the asserted
custom . . . . 'l'here was no evidence that defendant was a
farmer. [Citation.] So far as the record shows, defendant
was a stranger to farming customs.'' In the case at bar there
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is nothing to show that plaintiffs, or any of them, were farmers
or that they knew anything of farming customs.
Defendants argue that the purported custom and usage is
admissible to interpret the terms of the lease agreement rather
than to vary or contradict them. It will be recalled that the
lease provided that "upon the expiration or sooner or other
termination of this lease all of said pipe line and pumps so
built and installed as aforesaid, and all other improvements of
a substantial or permanent character or that rnay be attached
to the land, shall revert to and become the absolute property
of Lessor, free and clear of any and all claims against the
same." (Emphasis added.) It will be noted that the provision refers to improvements of a substantial or permanent
character or those attached to the land. [25] In Realty Dock
etc. Corp. v. Anderson, 174 Cal. 672, 676-677 [164 P. 4], we
held that "It is, of course, quite apparent that the term 'improvement' is comprehensive enough to embrace all additions
or alterations whieh may be made by a tenant for the convenience of his business upon the premises. It is much more
comprehensive than the word 'fixture,' and while including
these, includes also many things that may not be classed as
fixtures. In fact, if force is to be given to a provision in a
lease which provides that all 'improvements' made in premises shall inure to the lessor, it is difficult to conceive of any
subsequent addition, alteration, or repair to the premises
during the tenancy which would not be embraced within the
term 'improvement.' " We also held, in answer to the argument made by the lessee that the property was movable that
"It is not a matter of controlling importance whether the
vault as constructed was a permanent or a movable fixture.
We are not here considering the rights arising by operation of
law only between landlord and tenant as to the articles placed
upon the leased premises by the latter. On the contrary, these
rights are to be determined from the terms of the lease under
which the parties undertook to fix them." [26] Defendants'
contention that the custom and usage in Kern County was that
the tenant could remove improvements placed upon the land
is directly opposed to the terms of the lease which provides
that all such improvements shall remain on the land and become the absolute property of the lessor. The parties' intention, as expressed by their written agreement, is controlling
and, under their agreement "reasonable minds cannot but
agree" that the improvements here involved were covered by
50 C.2d-20
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the
of ihe lease heretofore
(1Vilmerton v.
lYlorton, 7·1 Cal.App.2d 891, 896 [1 69 P .2d
) . [27] 'l'he
lease here speei:fiea1ly separated substantial or permanent improvements from thoRe that might be aUaehrr1 to the land so
the movable character of any of the improvements under consideration is not a matter of "c-ontrolling importance." In
Allen v. Alberts, 82 Cal.App.2d 1:!, 16 [185 I'.2cl
, where
the lease proYided that all furniture, furnishings, equipment
or fixtures installed on the premises, or to he in;;ta1led, shonld
become the property of the lessor upon trrmination ol' the
lease, the eourt said in answer to an attempt by the Jessee
to introduce cvidenc•e of eustom and usage to the contrary:
'"rbis propositiou is likewise without merit. The lease herein
involved specifically provided that all persollal property and
furnishings installed in the premises should be a part of the
lease property and 1wlong to th(~ lessors. HPnee there was no
necessity for introducing any evidence as to custom and usage
:;;inee the agreement involvrd ~wac; sreeifil~ and lnlam biguous."
(Sharpe v. Arabian Limaican Oil Co., 111 Cal.App.2d 99 [244
P.2d 83]; Dca v. Davy, 150 Cal.App.2d 4:15 [309 P.2d 8!14];
Miller v. Stu Us, 143 Cal.App.2d 592 [800 P.2d 312] .) [28] It
clearly appears that eviden(:C relative to the purported custom and usage would tend to vary or eontradiet the terms of
the lt•ase agreement and is therefore inadmissible and the witnesses' testimony eonrcrning it is therefore not material.
Defendants' next argnr)l(mt is that "there still remains a
serious question of interpretation as to just what property is
substantial.'' Some of the prospective 1vitnesses whose r~on
vcnienee is being eonsiden~d were to testify to the Yalne of the
improvements. \Vhile the parties disagree, as is seen from the
complaint and answers thereto, as to the value of the improvements, it ~would appear that in either event the value
is substantial as distingniRhcd from ineonse(]uential. [29] In
In re Scroggin, 103 Cal.App.2d 281, 283 [229 P.2d 4801, the
court was considering the word "substantial" as it related to
the word "amount." It vvas there held that the word "sub~
stantial" "imports a considerable amount of value in opposition to that whieh is ineonst>qnential or small." Defendants
do not deny that the value of the improvement,; is substantial.
Plaintiffs and defendants agree that expert witnesses with a
per;;;onal knowledge of the faets of the partienlar case come
>vithin the rule that permits their c-onvenience to he considered (Figley v. Cal'ifornia <1rrow Airlines, 111 Cal.App.2d
285 [244 P.2d 472]) but they disagree as to the materiality
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of the testimony so far as this particular case is concerned.
[30a] In other words, plaintiffs argue that any appraiser
can give the same testimony without examining the property
and that the convenience of these witnesses should not be considered under the general rule. We agree with plaintiffs.
T·he pleadings allege the value of the improvements to be substantial within the meaning of the lease agreement. There is
nothing in the record to show that these witnesses are the only
witnesses who could testify to the value of the improvements
because of their personal knowledge of the facts of the case.
In the Figley case experts had examined the scene of an
airplane accident and were to give testimony as to their
opinion of the causes of the crash. [31] The court in affirming an order denying a change of venue said that ''Generally,
the convenience of experts should not be considered in determining the question of convenience of witnesses on application
for change of venue except where the experts have a personal
knowledge of the facts upon which their testimony is to be
based. (Security Investrnent Co. v. Gifford, 179 Cal. 277
[176 P. 444).)
''In this case, as we have commented, the court might
well have considered that what one of these men knew it
would be reasonable to suppose all knew, and hence the exception to the rule above stated, based upon personal knowledge of the experts, would have no application." (Pp. 287,
288.) [30b] In the case under consideration, affiants Cassady
and Gargan had made appraisals of the improvements moved
from the property. It appears from the affidavits that the
property can be located and it does not appear that any other
appraiser could not make the same inspection or that the
witnesses would testify that the improvements were not suhstantial within the meaning of the lease agreement. It does
not appear, therefore, that the convenience of these expert witnesses should be considered on the motion for change of venue.
[32] The matter of the value of the improvements is a
question for the trier of fact upon a trial of the case after
hearing expert testimony or receiving stipulation of the parties
and should not be considered upon a motion for a change of
venue. In Security Investment Co. v. Gifford, 179 Cal. 277
[176 P. 444]; Barnett v. United Oil Co., 5 Cal.App.2d 175
[42 P.2d 656]; W1·in v. Ohlandf, 213 Cal. 158 [1 P.2d 991];
and Pacific Coast etc. Ins. Co. v. Land Title Ins. Co., 97 Cal.
App.2d 829 [218 P.2d 573], it was held that the convenience
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of expert witnesses such as we have here could not be considered on a motion for a change of venue.
[33] Inasmuch as the witnesses' affidavits do not purport
to state that their testimony would be that the improvements
were not substantial within the meaning of the lease agreement
their testimony would not be material to the issues of the
case as presented on the motions for change of venue and
the affidavits were, therefore, improperly considered by the
trial court.
[34] \Vith reference to the other affidavits, convenience of
the parties is not to be considered upon a motion for a change
of venue ( W rin v. Ohlandt, 213 Cal. 158 [1 P.2d 991]) and
the case does not fall within the rule of Simonian v. Simonian,
97 Cal.App.2d 68, 69 [217 P.2d 157], where it was held that
a party's physical condition made it impossible for him to
travel to a distant county to give "material evidence." The
affidavit concerning the physieal disability of the senior defendant Fry did not aver that he would be ealled as a witness
to give "material evidenee" or state what his evidenee would
be. On the contrary, it appears that the younger defendant
Fry bad, for some time, been in charge of the Fry affairs.
[35] There is no merit to defendants' argument that defendant Mettler's books and records were located in Kern County
(Neet v. Holmes, 19 Cal.2d 605, 613, 614 (122 P.2d 557])
and that the court calendar in Kern County is less congested
than tl1at in l;os Angeles County inasmueh as neither of these
reasons falls within the statutory provision regarding change
of venue for convenience of witnesses.
Because the record does not show that the prospective witnesses whose convenience was under consideration would
testify to facts within their knowledge material to the issues of
the ease as distinguished from expert opinion evidence of
value, the trial court erroneously granted the motions for a
change of venue on this ground.
There being no support in the record for the order granting
defendants' motions for a change of venue, the order must be
and is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
McComb, J., dissented.
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